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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Arne's America Inc. Plaintiff 
(a Utah corporation that provided material 
hauling services to Defendants, American 
Consolidated Mining Co. and Victoria Mining 
and Milling Co. d/b/a Victoria Mining and 
Milling) 
American Consolidated Mining Co. Defendants 
(a Utah corporation that owns extensive mining 
claims in Tooele, Utah) 
Victoria Mining and Milling Corporation 
(a defunct Nevada corporation) 
Becho Inc. 
(a Utah corporation that provided blasting 
services at the mining claims at Arne's request. 
Becho obtained a separate judgment against Arne's, 
ACMC and VMMC) 
Alta Excavating 
(a Utah corporation that provided subcontractor 
services on the claims. Alta disavowed any 
interest in the claims as a mechanic's lien holder 
and withdrew from the litigation [R.504-505]) 
International Minerals and Metals, Inc. 
(an Ohio corporation that was defaulted out of the 
proceedings and did not participate at the trial) 
i 
IDENTITY OF WITNESSES CITED IN THE BRIEF 
Don Sullivan was the President of Arne's and was in charge of the 
operation of the mill. 
Stan Hicks was the Secretary-Treasurer of Arne's and reviewed most 
of Arne's invoices. 
Dave Sums ion was a part owner of Arne's. He lived at the mill and 
oversaw Plaintiff's trucking operation at the mine. 
William D. Moeller is the Chairman of the Board of American 
Consolidated Mining Company and was the President of Victoria 
Mining and Milling Company. 
Orson Blackner was the supervisor of the mining operation. He 
lived with Dave Sumsion and Bob Holliday at the Victoria mill 
and took his orders from Bob Holliday (T.11:66-68) . 
Bob Holliday is a director of ACMC and was hired by Defendants to 
develop an extraction process for the ore. He lived at the 
Victoria mill. One of his duties was to look out for ACMC's 
interest in the project. He reported regularly to Mr. Moeller 
(T.III: 110; IV:100). 
Pat Thorne is a certified public accountant and a partner in the 
accounting firm of DeNiro & Thorne who kept the books for both 
ACMC and VMMC. Mr. Thorne was an officer of Victoria. His 
partner was an officer of ACMC. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARNE'S AMERICA, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
AMERICAN CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., 
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ALTA EXCAVATING, INTERNATIONAL 
MINERALS AND METALS INC., 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appellate Case No. 950239-CA 
PRIORITY 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County 
in favor of Arne's America against American Consolidated Mining Co. 
and Victoria Mining and Milling Co. This court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is the judgment of the trial court supported by the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action against American Consolidated Mining 
Co. (ACMC) and Victoria Mining and Milling, Co. (VMMC) for breach 
1 
of contract and foreclosure of its mechanics lien. Defendants 
counterclaimed for breach of contract and waste. After a six day 
bench trial, a judgment of $1,315,841.79 and a pass through 
judgment of $110,880.42 were awarded in favor of Plaintiff. ACMC's 
mining claims were ordered sold to satisfy the lien claim and 
Defendants were no caused on their counterclaim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant must convince this court that the trial court's 
factual findings are not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 754 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 
1987). Defendant must show that the evidence so clearly 
preponderates in their favor that reasonable people would not 
differ on the outcome. E.A. Strout Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy 
& Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). The trial court's 
findings of fact may be reversed only if they are against "the 
clear weight of the evidence," thus making them "clearly 
erroneous." In re State v. Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). In 
making such a determination, this court must view the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Van Dyke v. 
Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Lake Philgas Serv. v. 
Valley Bank and Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 953n.l (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
American Consolidated Mining Company owns the Yellow Hammer, 
Cosmopolitan, Copperopolis, Centennial and Herat mining claims in 
Tooele, Utah. Victoria Mining and Milling Company was a Nevada 
corporation. Its officers were either acquaintances of William 
Moeller or board members of American Consolidated Mining (T.VI:65) . 
William Moeller is the Chairman of ACMC and was the President of 
VMMC. In 1985, ACMC transferred the right to mine its claims to 
VMMC for no charge. ACMC retained title to the properties 
(T.VI:65-66) . Both ACMC and VMMC obtained an option from Hecla 
Mining Company to purchase an ore processing mill located in Elko 
County, Nevada known as the Victoria Mine1. In 1985, Winslow Cady, 
ACMC and VMMC formed a joint venture known as Victoria Mining and 
Milling2 to develop the mining claims and to purchase the mill. 
In September, 1985, Arne's, ACMC and VMMC3 entered into what 
is known as the "trucking agreement" (Ex. 1) wherein Arne's agreed 
to mine the claims, remove "reasonable "overburden, crush the ore 
and transport it to the mill in Nevada for the price of $10.25 per 
1
 Although Defendant characterizes the option as belonging 
only to VMMC, ACM was clearly a party to that agreement. See 
Exhibits 1 (p. 1), 4 (1 A ) , 13 (I A ) . 
2
 There was some confusion on the part of the Plaintiff, 
concerning the identity of the parties since the Victoria name was 
used to refer both to the mill site known as the Victoria Mine, 
Victoria Mining and Milling Company and Victoria Mining and Milling 
which was the name of the joint venture. (See Ex. 1, p. 1) 
(T.I:87). 
3
 ACMC and VMMC were referred to collectively in the 
agreement as Victoria Mining and Milling or VMM (Ex. 1, p.l). 
3 
ton. Defendants retained general operational control over the 
project. 
The price for hauling was subsequently increased to $12.25 in 
lieu of various incentive bonuses that were to be paid to Arne's 
(Ex. 2). Arne's sent its invoices to DeNiro & Thorne, who were the 
accountants for both ACMC and VMMC, as it was instructed to do by 
William Moeller (Ex. 27, p. 2) (T.1:61-62; 11:29-30, 43-44). 
The relationship between the parties changed periodically. 
ACMC and VMMC could not pay Arne's for the majority of the work it 
did; therefore, Arne's offset some of its invoices against an 
ownership position in the project which was deducted from Mr. 
Cady's interest. In addition, Arne's agreed to provide $2,000,000 
to fund the purchase of the mill from Hecla subject to there being 
adequate quality ore generated by the project (Exs. 2, 4, 13). 
Eventually Arne's acquired all of Mr. Cady's interest either 
through ACMC and VMMC or directly from Mr. Cady (Ex. 20). 
Throughout the project the Defendants directed Arne's where 
and what to mine, and what to haul (R.630, I 9) (T.IV:53-54; V:27-
28). In October, 1985, the Defendants changed the method and 
location of the mining operation to a site where the ore body was 
significantly below the surface. This required Arne's to remove 
a substantial amount of overburden. Rather than haul it to the 
mill, Defendants directed Arne's to dump the overburden in 
designated areas. Since Plaintiff was paid only for material 
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hauled to the mill (T.I:21; IV:39)4, this represented a significant 
increase in Arne's work and a decrease in its compensation. The 
parties met at the Victoria Mill bunkhouse and agreed that 
Plaintiff would be paid $2.10 per ton for the overburden it 
removed. Plaintiff then changed its bills to show a separate 
overburden charge and submitted them to DeNiro & Thorne for 
payment. Some of the bills were paid in cash, some were paid by 
trade, but many were not paid. 
In November, 1985, the parties met in Salt Lake City to again 
restructure their relationship. By this time Mr. Cady had sold his 
remaining share of the project to Arne's and had withdrawn from the 
operation. Mort Stone, Defendant's attorney, flew from Ohio, took 
notes at the meeting and a few days later prepared a draft of a 
revised agreement (Ex. 12) and sent it to the parties. Don 
Sullivan for Arne's and William Moeller for Defendants reviewed and 
revised the draft. Mr. Sullivan was prepared to accept the 
agreement as revised but Mr. Moeller wanted it reviewed and retyped 
by Mr. Stone (T.I:37-39; VI:116-117). On November 22, Mr. Sullivan 
sent the revised agreement to Mr. Stone (Ex. 45). On January 2, 
1986, Mr. Stone returned the agreement to Mr. Sullivan with his 
apologies that he had "finally done" a redraft of the agreement as 
Mr. Sullivan had requested (Ex. 19). Mr. Sullivan signed the 
agreement and it was delivered to Mr. Moeller who also signed it 
(Ex. 13). The agreement was dated "as of November 11, 1985" 
4
 Later in the project, Defendants directed Arne's to stock 
pile ore near the mill. The price for that ore is included in 
Arne's judgment against Defendants (R.630, I 10). 
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although it was actually signed in January, 1986. All of the 
parties agreed that it was effective as of November 11 (R.633, f 
23). 
Because they did not have the funds to buy the mill, the 
Defendants extended their purchase option. In December, 1985, the 
Defendants sought another extension but Hecla demanded $144,270. 
Defendants still did not have the money, therefore, they 
requested that Plaintiff make the option payment for them. Arne's 
agreed to loan Defendants the money if it was released from its 
obligation to provide the $2,000,000 (Ex. 15). All of the parties 
agreed. Plaintiff loaned the money to the Defendants, the option 
was extended, and Plaintiff was released from its funding 
commitment. 
The venture had very limited success. In December, operations 
were suspended due to lack of both money and commercially 
marketable ore concentrate. The parties failed to obtain long-term 
financing. In March, 1986, Mr. Moeller, on behalf of ACMC and VMMC 
notified Arne's that it was in default because it had not provided 
the $2,000,000 (Ex. 26). Arne's filed mechanics liens on the 
mining claims (Exs. 16, 17) and this law suit followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment entered 
by the trial court are supported by voluminous evidence. 
The parties modified their contract and agreed that Plaintiff 
would be paid for overburden removal. The remoyal was necessary 
because Defendants changed the method and location of the mining 
6 
operation. Arne's changed its bills to show a separate overburden 
charge and submitted them to DeNiro & Thorne, Defendants' 
accountants, addressed to Victoria Mining and Milling as it was 
instructed to do. The Defendants acknowledged the new overburden 
charge in writing. 
The parties entered an agreement dated "as of" November 11 
which obligated Plaintiff to provide $2,000,000 to finance 
Defendants' option to purchase the mill. The agreement was signed 
in January but the obligations and liabilities attached as of 
November 11. 
In December, Arne's loaned ACMC and VMMC $144,270 to allow 
them to extend their option. In return, Defendants agreed to repay 
the money and to release Plaintiff from its funding commitment. At 
that time, the parties agreed that the release and loan was binding 
on all of the parties. 
Arne's mined where Defendants directed. Because the claims 
are contiguous and there were no visible boundaries, it was 
impossible to segregate the lien amounts. Defendant presented no 
evidence of any prejudice because of the amount of Arne's lien 
claim or its failure to segregate. 
Defendant now attempts to raise new issues and inject new 
theories into these proceedings that were not previously raised and 
are inconsistent with positions it asserted at trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO BE PAID 
FOR OVERBURDEN REMOVAL 
The judgment requiring Defendants to pay for overburden 
removal is amply supported by the record. 
A. The trial court properly held that Plaintiff was entitled 
to payment for overburden removal. The court found that there was 
an oral modification of the contract (R.631, 1 14-16). The 
trucking agreement (Ex. 1) provided that Arne's would be 
compensated for hauling material to the mill. That agreement 
obligated Arne's to remove overburden "as is reasonably necessary." 
(Ex. 1, I 4) (T.11:32-33). By October, however, the Defendants 
were complaining that the quality of ore coming to the mill was not 
sufficient to get good concentrate. As a result, Bob Holliday, the 
Defendants' representative, selected a different area to mine and 
directed Arne's to excavate from that location, haul the material 
to areas designated by him and use it to establish a tailings wall. 
Arne's immediately recognized that it was going to have to move a 
lot of worthless dirt in order to get down to the ore body selected 
by Mr. Holliday5. Because Arne's would be removing additional 
material, but would not be paid for it because it was not hauled to 
the mill, the parties met in the bunkhouse at the mill and agreed 
that Arne's would be paid $2.10 per ton for the overburden it 
5
 The area selected by Mr. Holliday required Arne's to 
completely recontour the slope of the mine walls (T.VI:114-115, 
134). 
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excavated and transported to the areas selected by Defendants 
(T.1:20-21)• 
The parties were free to, and did, modify the trucking 
agreement to include overburden compensation at the $2.10 rate. "A 
written contract may be modified by oral agreement between the 
parties. . . . Thus, a provision requiring that all modifications 
of a contract be in writing, may itself be waived orally or by 
conduct of the parties." 6A Corbin, Contracts, §1295. Parties to 
a written contract may modify its terms by a subsequent oral 
agreement even if the contract contains a provision requiring any 
modification to be in writing. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 
381 P.2d 86 (1963). See also, Cordillera Corp. v. Heard, 592 P.2d 
12 (Colo. App. 1978), aff'd 612 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1980). The 
Defendants waived, both orally and by their conduct, the 
requirement that modifications to the trucking agreement had to be 
in writing. The trial court properly held that Plaintiff should be 
paid for overburden removal at the agreed rate of $2.10 per ton. 
B. Plaintiff testified that there was an agreement to pay for 
overburden. On the first day of trial, Don Sullivan testified that 
the Defendants agreed to pay for overburden removal. His 
testimony, and that of other witnesses, amply supports the court's 
findings. Mr. Sullivan testified: 
" . . . Later on in the program, or the project, it 
became apparent, because ACM was complaining about moving 
dirt instead of ore, that we would have to move more dirt 
away, and not haul it to be able to move what they would 
call ore. And so under direction of Bob Holliday and 
others from the ACM staff, and also Victoria staff, we 
agreed to move additional amounts of overburden for 
9 
increased — for additional overburden removal fee which 
turned out to be two dollars a ton . . ." (T.1:20-21). 
Q. (By Mr. Bowen) Now, Mr. Sullivan, did the time come 
when you had a discussion with Mr. Moeller about the 
removal of overburden at the site? 
A. . . . And then Mr. Moeller, or it may have been Mr. 
Holliday at that time, complained that the ore coming 
from the mine site was not a high enough quality, so Mr. 
Holliday went to the mine site, selected a different area 
to dig from, and I think we still had Becho Excavating 
out there blasting at the time, and we recognized through 
a committee evaluation that we were going to have to move 
a lot of worthless dirt to get down to the ore that Mr. 
Holliday said was there. So for us moving the ore, and 
not hauling anything other than other areas where Mr. 
Holliday would select, we agreed with Mr. Moeller that 
there would be an additional charge per ton for 
overburden removal. And that was not hauling overburden, 
that was just blasting it, and pushing it over the side 
of the hill, and establishing a tailings' wall. 
Q. What was that rate? 
A. I think it was two dollars a ton. I may be wrong, 
but I believe it was two dollars a ton. There was a 
document that was written and presented to make a record 
of that agreement, which I presented to Mr. Moeller. He 
agreed verbally to pay that, and never did sign the 
agreement. 
Q. It says 2.10 a ton? 
A. I felt like that was covered in our original 
agreement which authorized additional monies to be paid 
for overburden removal at the time if it was required. 
Q. So starting then in October, mid part of October, 
did you then, when I say you, I mean Arne's, 
differentiate on your billing to ACM between the material 
that was hauled, and then the overburden? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. That was pushed aside. And you started then at that 
time to bill them for the overburden at the rate of 2.10 
a ton? 
A. (Witness nods affirmatively). 
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Q. You have to say — 
A. 2.10 a tonf yes. That's correct. 
Q. And how much for the ore? 
A. We're still hauling ore the at 12.25. 2.10 per ton 
covered blasting and everything required to move the rock 
and dirt aside. (T.1:35-36). 
C. Plaintiff is entitled to overburden compensation based 
either on a new contract or quantum meruit. Plaintiff is 
additionally entitled to compensation for overburden removal based 
upon either a new oral contract between the parties or quantum 
meruit. Everyone present at the October bunkhouse meetingf with 
the exception of Mr. Moeller and Bob Holliday, testified that there 
was an agreement between the parties that Arne's would be paid for 
overburden removal6. Stan Hicks testified that Orson Blacknerf the 
mining supervisor/ recommended a price of $2.10 per ton for 
overburden removed to the areas designated by Bob Holliday and that 
everyone agreed. Mr. Moeller attended the meeting (T.111:8-11). 
Mr. Hicks also testified that Arne's was authorized to bill for the 
overburden (T.Ill:24-25) and that Mr. Moeller agreed to pay the 
$2.10 price for its removal (T.111:57). Although Bob Holliday 
could not recall participating in a discussion about overburden 
6
 Orson Blackner recalled the meeting and a discussion about 
a separate price for overburden removal but could not recall what 
Mr. Moeller had to say (T.11:71-73). Mr. Blackner testified/ 
however/ that after the meeting overburden was handled differently 
than before. Mel Craig and Bob Holliday staked out the areas in 
which Plaintiff could dump the overburden (T.11:76). 
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removal (T.IV:103)7, the dump site was selected by him shortly 
after the October meeting (T.II: 123) and the new mining area was 
staked under his direction (T.11:74-75). Mr. Holliday admitted, 
however, that in order to get to good ore, the Plaintiff had to 
move a lot of overburden (T.IV:119, 127). Mr. Blackner and Mr. 
Moeller both testified that after the meeting Arne's began using an 
"Acey wagon"8 to move the overburden (T.11:70; VI:91). Bill 
Moeller argued, however, that the price for the overburden was 
supposed to be only $2.00 per ton (T.VI:94). He testified, 
nevertheless, that the Defendants reasonably expected to pay for 
excess overburden removal, and that if a proper written agreement 
had been presented to him he would have signed it (T.VI:96-97) . 
Mr. Moeller stated that "everybody recognized" that overburden that 
was more than common overburden needed to be paid for (T.VI:95). 
Mr. Moeller further testified that after the October meeting there 
was "obviously a cost change for moving overburden." (T.VI:97)9. 
Dave Sumsion testified that Defendants agreed to pay for overburden 
removal at the meeting (T.VI:133-135). 
After the meeting, Plaintiff included a separate charge for 
overburden on its bills. Those bills were paid, to the extent that 
7
 Besides the bunkhouse meeting, Bob Holliday, Don Sullivan 
and Orson Blackner had met a "day or two" earlier to discuss a 
price for the overburden removal (T.II:73). 
8
 An Acey wagon is a large dump truck that has a tractor on 
the front of two wheels and two wheels on the back (T.II:71). 
9
 At trial Mr. Moeller's concern was not so much the price 
for the overburden removal but the volume. He admitted, however, 
that he had no idea how many tons of overburden were removed 
(T.VI:95). 
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any of Plaintiff's bills were paid, without complaint (T.11:53). 
Stan Hicks testified that he specifically called the attention of 
Defendants' accountants, DeNiro & Thorne, to the new overburden 
charge on the bill (T.111:26). Mr. Moeller testified that if there 
were any unusual items on a bill Mr. Thorne would call him 
(T.VI:101). Mr. Thorne did not call about the overburden bills. 
Significantly, Mr. Moeller never sent anything in writing to 
Plaintiff complaining about the overburden charge (T.VI:94). 
There is overwhelming evidence that Arne's is entitled to 
additional compensation for overburden removal. Subsequent to the 
October bunkhouse meeting, the method of mining changed at 
Defendants' request and the overburden was treated in a different 
fashion (T.11:76; 111:11). The billing was changed to include a 
separate overburden charge, (Exs. 21 (D, G), 22, 23) which was paid 
without complaint (T.II:53). By whatever applicable standard, the 
only possible explanation is that the parties arrived at an 
agreement at the bunkhouse to pay Arne's $2.10 for overburden 
removal and the court so found. 
D. There was a writing and part performance on the part of 
Defendants. Plaintiff's invoice of October 18, 1985, #10346 
(Ex.23), billed the Defendants for "removal of 28,000 yards of 
previously blasted overburden at $2.10 per yard." Plaintiff's 
invoice of November 3, 1985, #10349 (Ex.22), billed the Defendants 
$81,420 for "removable [sic] of overburden at Victoria Mine, NV." 
On November 26, 1985, over a month after the bunkhouse meeting, the 
parties agreed that in lieu of Arne's providing $150,000 in 
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operating capital, as it had agreed to do, they would offset that 
amount against invoices 10346 and 10349 both of which contained 
overburden charges (See Exs. 11, 22, 23). William G. Moeller 
signed and initialled the agreement (Ex. 11) (T.VI:68-69) which 
contains an acknowledgment that after the offset Defendants still 
owed Arne's $36,423.65 for overburden removal. Defendants, 
therefore, agreed in writing that Arne's was to be paid for 
overburden removal at the $2.10 rate. In addition, two weeks 
prior, Defendants had paid Plaintiff $60,840 for overburden removal 
as part of the $75,000 payment known as the "Advance 11/14" (See 
Ex. 31, invoice #AA 1035). The Defendants acknowledged in writing 
and by payment and partial performance that Plaintiff was to be 
compensated for overburden removal at the rate of $2.10 and the 
court so found (R.631, f 16). 
E. Defendant's reliance on the Statute of Frauds is 
misplaced. Defendant neither pled the Statute of Frauds as an 
affirmative defense, as required by Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, nor contended at trial that it was applicable to this 
case10. As a result, it cannot be raised here. James v. Preston, 
746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In any event, the Statute of Frauds does not preclude 
enforcement of the oral modification to the contract since Arne's 
acted upon the modification by removing and dumping the overburden 
10
 After the close of testimony, Defendants requested that the 
court allow it to amend its pleadings to raise several new 
defenses. Significantly, the Statute of Frauds was not one of the 
new defenses requested (R.550-551). 
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as Defendants requested11 and Defendants accepted Plaintiff's 
performance by staking out the dump sites and paying or trading 
Plaintiff for a portion of the overburden hauling. The performance 
by Arne's and the acceptance of that performance by Defendants 
satisfies any requirement of the Statute of Frauds. See, 72 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §278. A party who has performed 
according to the oral agreement may recover according to the terms 
of that agreement. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, §279. 
II 
ACMC'S ARGUMENT THAT IT DID NOT REVIEW 
OR APPROVE THE INVOICES IS NOT CREDIBLE 
DeNiro & Thorne maintained the books for both ACMC and 
Victoria. Pat Throne, a partner in DeNiro & Thorne, attended 
shareholder meetings for ACMC and board of director meetings for 
Victoria (T.IV:6-7). His partner was an officer of ACMC (T.IV:29). 
If there was anything amiss with the bills Mr. Thorne would call 
Mr. Moeller (T.VI:101). Plaintiff was directed by Mr. Moellerr who 
was both the Chairman of the Board for ACMC and the President of 
Victoria Mining and Milling Company, to submit its invoices to 
DeNiro & Thorne and to address all invoices to Victoria Mining and 
Milling (T.1:61-62; 11:30-31; VI:93) (See also Ex. 27, p. 2). When 
Arne's designated "Victoria Mining and Milling" on its bills, it 
was referring to the combined joint venture entity12 (T.I:18, 61-
11
 Over 200,000 cubic yards of overburden were moved by 
Plaintiff under its new agreement (R.632, f 17). 
12
 Exhibit 1 refers to ACMC and VMMC jointly as Victoria 
Mining and Milling. Plaintiff continued to use VMMC or VMM 
throughout the project to refer to the entity which included ACMC 
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62; 11:30, 43-44). No one ever complained that the bills were not 
addressed to ACMC. Mr. Moeller signed the checks when the bills 
were paid (Ex. 38). Defendant's suggestion that Plaintiff should 
be penalized because it followed Mr. Moeller's specific 
instructions is absurd13. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFF WAS RELEASED BY ALL PARTIES FROM ITS OBLIGATION 
TO PROVIDE $2,000,000 TO PURCHASE THE VICTORIA MINE 
There is abundant evidence that Plaintiff was released by 
Defendants from its obligation to provide long-term financing for 
the project. 
A. Arne's obligation to raise $2,000,000 was terminated on 
December 13, 1985. Paragraph 9(b) of the November 11th agreement 
(Ex. 13) required Arne's to raise $2,000,000 so that Defendants 
could purchase the Victoria Property; however, Arne's had no 
obligation to fund an extension of Defendants' option with Hecla. 
By December the project was in serious trouble. Arne's knew that 
if the project failed it could not provide the $2,000,000. 
Defendants requested $144,270 from Arne's which, if the money was 
not paid back, would place Arne's in serious jeopardy. The purpose 
of Exhibit 15 was to get further guarantees from American 
Consolidated and Victoria to protect Arne's money in case the 
(T.I:51, 61-62; 11:44,53). 
13
 ACMC seems to imply that it did not know what was going on. 
Robert Holliday, however, was present on the project almost daily 
from its inception. As an officer of ACMC, it was his assignment 
to "observe, and to report" and to watch out for the interests of 
ACMC. He reported to Mr. Moeller weekly (T.111:110; IV:100). 
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project defaulted. Arne's agreed to provide the $144,270 only if 
it was released from the $2,000,000 obligation (T.1:48-50). In 
exchange for the funds, Defendants terminated Arne's $2,000,000 
obligation and gave it a lien on the Victoria Property with a 
repayment priority from cash flow14. Plaintiff's obligation to 
fund the project was terminated on December 13, 1985 (Ex. 15). 
B. The release and indemnification applied to all entities. 
Mr. Moeller and Mr. Sullivan each testified that the release and 
indemnification contained in Exhibit 15 related to all of the 
parties. Mr. Sullivan testified that upon payment of the $144,270, 
Arne's obligation to pay $2,000,000 was null and void, that Arne's 
would no longer be liable for that contribution and that it would 
be completely indemnified and held harmless by all entities 
(T.1:48-50). Mr. Moeller testified that upon payment of the 
$144,270, Arne's was "completely released" from the $2,000,000 
commitment. He stated: 
Q: (Mr. Bowen) All right. And that was your understanding, 
that by signing that, that Arne's was in fact relieved from 
the commitment? 
A: They were relieved of this particular commitment. 
Q: Yeah, the two million commitment, they were relieved of 
that? 
A: Well, they were already in default. 
Q: Just answer my question. 
14
 In its Summary of Argument ACMC alleges that there was no 
consideration for the release. Since Defendant has not briefed 
that contention, Plaintiff assumes that it was abandoned and 
therefore will not respond in detail. Suffice it to say, however, 
that without the release, Plaintiff would not have loaned 
Defendants the money (T.1:48-50). 
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A: Yes. 
Q: It was your understanding based on that agreement that 
Arne's was completely released from the $2,000,000 obligation; 
correct? 
A: That's what it says. 
Q: That's correct. That's your understanding? 
A: Yes. That's my understanding. (T.VI:90-92). 
Responding to questions from Defendants' counsel Mr. Moeller 
testified: 
Q: (Mr. Stringer) Now, under the terms of the guarantee 
agreement, well, let me ask you this: Is it you understanding 
that prior to the guarantee agreement, Arne's was on the hook 
to fund the project? 
A: We've reviewed the document several times, and the answer 
is they were. 
Q: All right. Now, when the guarantee agreement, here, 
Exhibit 15, was signed was Arne's let off the hook as to the 
funding of the project? 
A: Well, I suppose it was. It says that they'll be relieved 
of the two million. (T.VI:51). 
Mr. Moeller also testified that upon execution of Exhibit 15, 
Arne's was "released" and "through" with its loan commitment 
(T.VI:54)15. Mr. Sullivan testified that the reference in Exhibit 
15 to VMM was to the joint entity which included ACM and VMMC 
(T.11:51) (See also Ex. 1, p. 1). The terms ACM and VMMC were used 
interchangeable by Arne's. To Arne's, ACM and VMMC were one in 
15
 Mr. Moeller also testified in his deposition that the 
indemnification was from all the parties (T.11:106). 
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the same, particularly after Mr. Cady dropped out of the project16. 
The intent of the document was for Arne's to be indemnified and 
released from its $2,000,000 promise by all of the entities 
represented by Mr. Moeller (T.II:104-106). 
C. Defendant's contention that it was not bound by the 
December 13th release is inconsistent with its position at trial. 
Defendants offered no evidence at trial that challenged Mr. 
Sullivan's statements that the release was from all parties. In 
fact, Mr. Moeller agreed (T.VI:51, 90-92). Defendant's contention 
that the release of Plaintiff was binding only on VMMC is 
inconsistent with its position at trial. In their Answer and 
Counterclaim, Defendants admitted that Plaintiff was relieved of 
its $2,000,000 investment obligation (R.0091, I 9, p. 6 of 8). In 
their Post Trial Memorandum, Defendants state that "all parties 
agree that if this document [Ex. 15] were operative, it would 
relieve Arne's of the funding obligation" (emphasis added), and 
that "if the guarantee were operative, then Arne's was 'off the 
hook'" (R.00561). The trial court found that Exhibit 15 was 
operative and that Arne's was released from its funding promise 
(R.634, f 26-28). There is voluminous evidence supporting the 
court's findings. 
D. The use of the word "indemnify" was proper. At trial 
Defendants had no problem with Plaintiff's use of the word 
"indemnify" in Exhibit 15. This issue is raised for the first time 
16
 Cady withdrew on November 5th (Ex. 20). The release was 
signed on December 13th (Ex. 15). 
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on appeal. In fact, Defendants in their counterclaim alleged that 
Mr. Moeller signed Exhibit 15 "indemnifying" Plaintiff against the 
$2,000,000 investment "thereby relieving Plaintiff of this 
obligation." (R.0091, f 9, p. 6 of 8). Plaintiff believed that 
"indemnify" meant that it was released from its obligation. Mr. 
Sullivan testified that the word "indemnify" was used because he 
believed that the word meant that "you were completely held not 
liable." He thought that it was "nice legal language" to put into 
the agreement (T.I:60). Defendants offered no contrary testimony. 
E. ACMC is obligated to repay the $144,270 loan. Since 
Defendants have admitted that Exhibit 15 was binding on all of the 
entities, that portion of the document requiring repayment of the 
loan is also binding upon ACMC. ACMC was a party to the purchase 
option. Payment of the option extension benefitted ACMC as well as 
VMMC17. Mr. Sullivan testified that the designation of VMMC on the 
Exhibit was a reference to both Defendants (T.1:50-51; 11:105-106). 
Defendants offered no contrary testimony. 
IV 
THE NOVEMBER 11 AGREEMENT IS EFFECTIVE AS OF ITS STATED DATE 
Exhibit 13, the agreement dated "as of" November 11, 1985, is 
effective as of its stated date regardless of when it was signed. 
A. The November 11 Agreement was back-dated. Plaintiff 
acknowledges that Exhibit 13 was back-dated. It was actually 
17
 ACMC claims that it was damaged as a result of the loss of 
the Hecla option (T.VI:59). If ACMC were not a party to the 
option, it would have no damages when the option failed. 
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signed in early January 1986, but all of the parties agreed that it 
was to take effect as of November 11, 1985 (T.11:51-52). 
B. The Agreement takes effect as of its date* The parties to 
a contract may agree that it be given effect as of a certain date, 
and when that is done the parties will be bound by the contract. 
In 17A Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts, §184, it states: "where parties to 
a written agreement provide that it is entered into 'as of a date 
earlier than that on which it was executed, the agreement is 
effective retroactively 'as of' the earlier date and the parties 
are bound accordingly thereby." In accord is Williston on 
Contracts, Vol. 2, 4th ed. (1991), §6.60 at p. 728-729. It states 
"on the other hand, it seems clear that, where the parties 
themselves agree that a contract should be given effect as of a 
certain specified date, absent the intervention of third party 
rights, there is no sound reason why that agreement should not be 
given effect." Parties can agree that a contract can take effect 
as of a date earlier than that on which it was executed, and when 
this is done the parties will be bound by the contract. Brewer v. 
National Security Corp., 169 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1948). See also, 
Sweetman v. Strescon Industries, Inc., 389 A.2d 1319 (Del. Super 
1978) (assigning a date to a contract which antedates the execution 
of the contract in the absence of express language showing a 
contrary intention, makes the contract effective on the date which 
the contract bears); American Cyanimide Co. v. Ring, 248 Ga. 673, 
286 S.E.2d 1 (1982) (the effective date of a contract is not the 
date of execution where the contract expressly states that its 
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terms are to take effect at an earlier date); Guldstein v. Ipswitch 
Hosiery Co., 104 Ga. App. 500, 122 S.E.2d 339 (1961) (it is 
elemental that contracting parties may agree to give retroactive 
effect between themselves to their contracts as they see fit); 
East Cent. Oklahoma Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Oklahoma Gas & 
Electric Company, 505 P.2d 1324 (Okla. 1973) (parties may agree 
that a written contract shall take effect as of a date earlier than 
that on which it is executed; when this is done, the parties are 
bound by the agreement); Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien 
Const. Co., 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979) (parties to a contract may 
execute an agreement on one date and provide that all rights, 
obligations and liabilities thereto attach respectively as of a 
retroactive date). 
C. The parties intended the Agreement to take effect as of 
November 11 . 1985. According to the testimony of Don Sullivan, it 
was a common practice to back-date documents so they would take 
effect as of a certain date (T.11:32, 52). Exhibit 27, for 
example, refers to a meeting held on September 5, 1985 for the 
purpose of executing the trucking agreement (Ex. 1) which is dated 
"as of" the first day of September 1985. Mr. Sullivan further 
testified that it was his intention that the contract be dated, and 
therefore take effect, as of November 11, 1985. If the contract 
was not effective as of November 11, 1985, Mr. Sullivan stated that 
he would not have signed it (T.11:51-52). Mort Stone's January 2nd 
letter makes two specific references to the "November 11 agreement" 
(Ex. 19) as does Mr. Moeller's default letter of March 5, 1986 (Ex. 
22 
26). There is no testimony that the contract was not to take 
effect as of the November 11th date. 
D. Defendants view of the effect of backdating the November 
11th agreement is wrong. Defendant acknowledges that the parties 
signed Exhibit 13 in January, 1986, agreeing that it would take 
effect "as of" November 11, 1985; however, it completely ignores 
the effect of backdating the document and argues as though it had 
been dated in January, 1986. If Exhibit 13 took effect as of 
November 11, 1985, it could not, as Defendant claims, have the 
effect of voiding the subsequent December 13th agreement since the 
$2,000,000 obligation it imposed attached as of the November 11th 
date. Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const. Co., supra. 
Defendant's argument that the effect of the November 11th agreement 
was to reinstate Plaintiff's $2,000,000 obligation after it had 
been released from that obligation in December, is wrong. The 
November 11th agreement must be read it as it falls 
chronologically, i.e. the agreement of September 8th (Ex. 2), the 
agreement of October 11, 1985 (Ex. 4) 1 8, the November 5, 1985 stock 
purchase agreement (Ex. 20), then the November 11th agreement (Ex. 
13), and finally the December 13, 1985 indemnification, release and 
loan (Ex. 15); thus, the release occurred after the obligation 
arose. 
E. Defendant recites erroneous "facts" relating to the 
execution of the November 13, 1985 agreement. Defendant has failed 
18
 The September 8th and October 11th agreements were 
terminated and replaced by the November 11 agreement (Ex. 13, 
1 14(g)). 
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to set forth facts consistent with the court's findings. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991); Barker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc.f 740 P.2d 1361 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1987). Defendant continues to propose "facts" that were 
rejected by the trial court and are not supported by the record. 
The parties agree that they met and went over the draft of the 
November 11th agreement (Ex. 12) and made changes to it. Although 
Mr. Sullivan was prepared to sign the interlineated document, which 
Mr. Moeller had initialed but not signed, Mr. Moeller insisted that 
it be reviewed and retyped by Mr. Stone. On November 22, the 
revised agreement (Ex. 12) was sent to Mort Stone to incorporate 
the changes (Ex. 45). On January 2, 1986, Mr. Stone sent the 
revised document to Mr. Sullivan referencing Sullivan's letter of 
November 22, 1985 (Ex. 19). Mr. Stone's letter asked Mr. Sullivan 
to execute the document and deliver it to Mr. Moeller, which he did 
(T.1:76-77; IV:116-117). Conspicuously absent from Mr. Stone's 
letter is any reference to the telephone call that was supposedly 
made by Mr. Sullivan to Mort Stone as Defendant argues. Indeed, 
Mr. Moeller's unsupported testimony, which is the sole basis for 
Defendant's contention, makes no sense at all within the context of 
the letters. The revised document was sent to Mort Stone on 
November 22. Mort Stone "finally" got around to the redraft and 
returned the "November 11" agreement to Mr. Sullivan in January of 
1986 (Ex. 19). There was no reason for Mr. Sullivan to call Mort 
Stone in December and request that the document be revised and sent 
to him since, by Mr. Stone's own letter (Ex. 19), Mr. Sullivan had 
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already sent the revised document to him on November 22, 1985 (Ex. 
45). Mr. Moeller testified that his meeting with Mr. Sullivan 
occurred during the latter part of December, "after the 13th of 
December but before the end of the year" (T.VI:100-101). If that 
were so, Mr. Stone could hardly be faulted for "finally" getting 
around to preparing the revised agreement by January 2nd. Mr. 
Moeller's testimony and Defendant's contention that Mr. Sullivan 
came to him with the revised agreement and requested that the 
parties sign it to reinstate Arne's financing obligation is not 
supported by any of the exhibits and is vehemently denied by Mr. 
Sullivan19. In any event, even if Mr. Moeller's testimony were 
true, which Plaintiff contends it is not, and which the trial court 
obviously rejected, the agreement would still be effective as of 
November 11, 1985 and thus subject to the indemnification release 
dated December 13, 1985. There is no credible evidence that the 
parties intended anything other than that Exhibit 13 take effect as 
of November 11, 1985. 
F. There were many reasons for executing the November 11th 
agreement in January. Defendant's present argument that "the whole 
purpose of entering into the revised Nov. 11 Agreement in January, 
1986, was to resurrect the project" (App. Brief, p. 33) is simply 
not true. There were many reasons why the agreement was signed. 
19
 Mr. Sullivan testified: 
Q: Did you ever take Exhibit 13 then, to Mr. Moeller and 
express to him that you wanted to be back involved in the 
project and obligated to raise $2,000,000? 
A: Never. That did not happen. (T.VI:118). 
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The November 11 agreement was vital to the continuity of the 
transactions between the parties. It recognized the Cady sale and 
the resulting adjustment of ownership percentages20, and thus 
eliminated the need for Mr. Cady to sign the agreement21. It 
terminated several prior agreements22. It clarified the Hecla 
option and the extension that had been granted, it provided for the 
distribution of the proceeds from the RIHT loan (T.I: 38), it 
changed the business entity to be formed from a joint venture to 
possibly a limited partnership (Ex. 13, f 1), and it clarified 
Arne's responsibility and control as being limited to the Victoria 
Property (Ex. 13, f 5(a)). In early January the parties were still 
trying to salvage the project (T.IV:81, 116-117). Absent the 
November 11th Agreement the controlling documents would either be 
the partially executed Exhibit 4 or a hodge podge of various other 
letters, agreements or understandings. 
V 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE AMOUNT OF 
THE BECHO JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REDUCED IS NOT WELL TAKEN 
On August 17, 1993, Becho obtained a judgment in this case 
against Plaintiff "in the amount of $44,217.62, plus interest in 
20
 Doug Marriott and Ed McLaughlin are introduced as new 
equity holders. 
21
 Cady had not signed the October 11th Agreement, neither had 
he signed the other documents purporting to transfer portions of 
his interest in the project to Plaintiff. (See Exs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 11). 
22
 The agreement of July 29, 1985 (Ex. 43),the September 8/12 
agreement (Ex. 2) and the October 11 agreement (Ex. 4) were all 
terminated by f 14g of Exhibit 13. 
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the amount of 1^% per month (18% per year) from and after October 
15, 1985, $105,900, plus a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount 
of $4,725.00, plus costs of court in the amount of $255.42, with 
interest to run upon the total amount at the rate of 18% per annum" 
(R.361, 1 1). Becho's judgment against Arne's was caused by 
Defendants' refusal to pay Arne's invoices (R.637, f 41). The 
"pass through judgment" includes only the interest, attorneys fees 
and costs assessed against Arne's by the Becho judgment (R.637-638, 
5 3). It does not include any amount for the work Becho did as a 
subcontractor23. The pass through is not included in the lien 
judgment (R.640-641, f 1-3). Defendant does not dispute the 
validity of the pass through24, only the amount. Defendant's 
contention that the pass through contains duplicate charges for 
Becho's work is erroneous. 
VI 
THE COURT'S JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE 
WAS PROPER 
Defendant cites in passing §38-1-8 and §38-1-25 U.C.A. Such 
statutes are inapplicable since Defendant presented no evidence to 
show that Plaintiff's claim was intentionally excessive or that it 
was intended to cloud Defendant's title or extract more than was 
due. In deed, the amount of Plaintiff's proven lien claim, with 
23
 The amount of interest, attorney's fees and costs is: 
$110,880.42 ($105,900 + $4,725 + $255.42). 
24
 Paragraph 9 of Exhibit 1 requires Defendants to indemnify 
Arne's "from any damage, cost, charge, or expense, whether direct 
or indirect . . . to which Arne's may be subjected by reason of any 
action, omission, or default" by the Defendants. 
27 
interest, is more than the amount stated in the amended lien 
notice25. Defendants directed Plaintiff where and when to mine 
(R.630, f 9) (T.VI:53-54). The claims are contiguous. There were 
no visible boundaries between them and any markings were 
obliterated by the excavation work (T.1:54-55: 111:11-13). It was 
impossible for Plaintiff to allocate its work among the various 
claims. Failure to allocate, however, is not fatal to Plaintiff's 
lien. Projects Unlimited v. Cooper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738 
(Utah 1990). Defendant presented no evidence of prejudice due 
either to Plaintiff's failure to segregate or to the amount of 
Plaintiff's lien claim and now raise the issue for the first time 
on appeal26. Plaint is the successful party in this litigation and 
is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to both §38-1-18, Utah Code 
Annotated and section 18 of the trucking agreement (Ex. 1) and the 
court so found. The judgment provides for after accruing 
attorney's fees, therefore, Plaintiff should be awarded additional 
fees for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's factual findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Defendant cannot show that the 
25
 Although included in the amount of the amended mechanics 
lien notice, Plaintiff's judgment of foreclosure does not include 
the $144f270 loan, interest at 2h% per day or standby expenses; 
thus, Defendants' complaints about these items are irrelevant. 
26
 ACMC's contentions that it was forced to "expend thousands 
of dollars" to defend against excessive lien claims, that 
Plaintiff's "excessive lien" clouded ACMC's title and that it 
suffered "prejudice" (Defendant's Brief, p. 39) are bereft of any 
supporting evidence in the record. 
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court's decision was clearly erroneous or against the weight of the 
evidence. Defendant is attempting to inject new issues in this 
appeal, change tactics and withdraw concessions made at trial. The 
pass through judgment relates only to interest, attorney's fees and 
court costs and does not contain a duplicate award for the work 
done by Becho. tfhe judgment of the trial court should be affirmed 
and Plaintiff awarded attorney's fees for this appeal. 
Dated this ]<i day of September, 1995. 
J. THOMAS BOWEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX 
Agreement of October 14, 1985 (Ex. 11), signed by Mr. Moeller 
on November 26, 1985, agreeing to set off $150,000 in invoices 
containing overburden charges and agreeing that $36,423.65 
remained due for overburden removal. 
Invoice dated October 18, 1985 (Ex. 23) for overburden removal 
off set pursuant to Exhibit 11. 
Invoice dated November 3, 1985 (Ex. 22) for overburden 
removal. A portion was off set pursuant to Exhibit 11. 
Summary of Plaintiff's invoices (Ex. 31) showing invoice 
#10355 in the amount of $60,840 paid by Defendants. 
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APPENDIX A 
( § ) ARNE'S 
'AMERICA'S TRAILER - BUILT TO STAY ON THE JOB 
P.O. Box 9223 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109 
(801) 261-0652 
GRAVEL TRAILERS 
LOW BED TRAILERS 
FLAT DECK TRAILERS 
END DUMP TRAILERS 
BOTTOM DUMP TRAILERS 
TRUCK BOXES 
CUSTOM MANUFACTURING 
AGREEMENT 
October 14, 1985 
Arne's America, Inc. (Arnefs) agrees to apply i t s best 
ef for ts in obtaining funds in the amount of approximately 
$150,000.00 to be used as operating capital for the Victoria 
Mine Project. Once this amount is made available<:to Victoria Min-
ing and Mi l l ing for said purpose, American Consolidated Mining 
(ACM), Victoria Mining and Mi l l ing (VMM), Winslow M. Cady, and 
(J/~ Myron B. Child a9 r e^*gyf l rant an additional 6% of ownership in 
(//i^aiid MuiidiQl OF VM^amFtlre Project including,an ^additional 6% , / * % r, 
^ / o <!„ s h * r e of^the net prof i ts generated by the P p S j ^ c t ^ ^ j ? / ^ - ^ ^ ^ Z ^ T ^ A 
foregoing: 
*& 
Tames D. Sullivan, President, 
Arne's America, Inc. 
Jil l iam 0. Moel 
American Consolidated Mining & 
President, Victoria Mining and 
Milling 
Winslow M. Cady and Vice-Presi-
dent, Victoria Mining and Milling 
Consul ta/rtf 
ZJZU* 
^ _ ^ ^ ^ *A*'**«j2~Z^«f™ ***** 
OPPICP AT AIOO sm ITM ano PART I <5AI T I AKP CITY i IT A 
APPENDIX B 
A R N E ' S [^DEFENDANT'S f ^ E X H I B I T ^ 
A M E R I C A I B C 
P 0. Box 9 2 2 3 , Salt Lake City, Utah, 8 4 1 0 9 
INVOICE NUMBER 
AA10346 
DATE 
October 18, 85 
TYPE OF INVOICE 
D Product D Part 
m Service 
• Publication 
MODEL / PART / PUBLICATION NO. VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PROD/DEL. DATE: 
10/3-15/85 
QUANTITY 
See Below 
TYPE OF ORDER 
D Retail D Stock D Government D Fleet 
SALES CODE 
(DEALER/CUSTOMER 
VICTORIA MINING AND MILLING 
DEALER/CUSTOMER ADDRESS 
1761 S 900 W, SLC, UTAH, 84104 
DELIVERY ADDRESS (IF DIFFERENT FROM DEALER) 
VICTORIA MINE, NEVADA 
PARTS CODE 
REMOVAL OF 28 ,000 YARDS OF PREVIOUSLY 
BLASTED OVERBURDEN AT $2.10/YARD 
REMOVAL OF OVERBURDEN AT AN HOURLY RATE AS 
ESTABLISHED IN AGREEMENT DATED OCTOBER 
17, 1985, PREPARED FOR SIGNATURE. 
NOTE: SEND PAYMENT TO - ARNE'S AMERICA,INC. 
PO BOX 9223 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109 
$58, .00 
42,720.00 
SUBTOTAL $101,520.00 
EXCISE TAX Federal 
State / Provincial 
ADVERTISING FUND 
FREIGHT 
MISCELLANEOUS 
TOTAL $101,520.00 
LESS: 
Industry Equivalency Adjustment (I E A) 
Government Price Concession 
Pre-Paid Deposit 
BALANCE DUE $101,520.00 
TYPE OF PAYMENT 
• Check D Draft 
FINANCE SOURCE ACCOUNT NUMBER 
VMM 100 
TERMS OF PAYMENT 
LJ Due on delivery Net Plus ' 3 Days 
PLANT OF MANUFACTURE 
ARNE'S 
America Inc. 
AA114 
Gen Sales 2-85 
APPENDIX C 
A R N E ' S 
A M E R I C A I H C 
P. 0. Box 9223, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109 
INVOICE NUMBER 
AA10349 
DATE 
1 1 - 3 - 8 5 
TYPE OF INVOICE 
D Product • Part 
• Service 
D Publication 
MODEL / PART / PUBLICATION NO. 
N/A 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
N/A 
PROD./DEL.DATE: 
N/A 
QUANTITY 
SEE BELOV 
TYPE OF ORDER 
D Retail D Stock D Government • Fleet 
SALES CODE 
N/A 
[DEALER/CUSTOMER 
VICTORIA MINING AND MILLING 
DEALER/CUSTOMER ADDRESS 
1761S . 9 0 0 V . SLC, UT. 
DELIVERY ADDRESS (IF DIFFERENT FROM DEALER) 
VICTORIA MINE, NV. 
PARTS CODE 
N/A 
REMOVABLE OF OVERBURDEN AT VICTORIA MINE, NV. 
HAULING OF 5 STEEL BEAMS TO VMM SITE IN NEVADA 
165 GALS. OF 1 5 - 4 0 CHEVRON OIL 
165 GALS. OF 3 0 0 - 1 0 CHEVRON 
165 GALS. OF 4 0 0 - 1 0 CHEVRON 
4 0 0 LBS. OF GEAR GREASE 
3 DRUMS 
BILLED TO DENIRO & THORNE 
2 3 3 E. 3 9 0 0 SO. 
SLC, UT. 
PAYABLE UPON RECEIPT 
OF THIS INVOICE. 
NOTE: SEND PAYMENT TO - ARNE'S AMERICA JNC. 
PO BOX 9223 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109 
$ 81,420.00 
390.00 
804.37 
769.72 
816.75 
324.60 
210.00 
SUBTOTAL $ 84,735.44 
EXCISE TAX Federal 
State / Provincial 
ADVERTISING FUND 
FREIGHT 
MISCELLANEOUS TAX ON OIL PRODUCTS 168.21 
TOTAL $ 84,903.65 
LESS 
Industry Equivalency Adjustment (I EA) 
Government Price Concession 
Pre-Paid Deposit £&#& ti 
TERMS OF PAYMENT 
Due on delivery D Net Plus 
® ARNE'S America Inc. AA114 Gen Sales 2-85 
APPENDIX D 
INVOICE NUMBER DATE DESCRIPTION 
AA10038 
AA10338 
AA10339 
AA10340 
AA10341 
AA10342 
AA10343 
AA10344 
AA10345 
AA10346 
AA10347 
AA10348 
AA10349 
AA10350 
AA10352 
AA10353 
AA10354 
AA10355 
AA10356 
AA1Q357 
AA10358 
AA10359 
AA10360 
AA10361 
AA1Q363 
AA1Q364 
TOTALS 
9/26/85 
9/9/85 
9/9/85 
9/13/85 
9/30/85 
10/2/85 
10/3/85 
10/3/85 
10/19/85 
10/18/85 
11/2/85 
11/2/85 
11/3/85 
11/14/85 
11/16/85 
8/27/85 
11/21/85 
11/22/85 
11/29/85 
12/5/85 
12/18/85 
12/18/85 
12/26/85 
1/2/86 
2/3/86(2/19/86) 
2/19/86 
Fuel 
Labor/Freight 
Forklift Rental 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Fuel 
$ 4156.00 
1781.00 
1338.00 
11315.85 
9870.00 
7792.50 
Freight/Forklift Rental 1544.00 
September Tonnage 150205.82 
Fuel 5485.00 
Blasting/Overburden 101520.00 
Fuel/POL 4316.55 
Parts/Airfare/Fuel 6736.53 
0verburden/Fre1ght/P0L 84903.65 
Labor/ForkHft/Tonnage 156181.20 
Parts 1574.10 
Freight 600.00 
Fuel/Freight 10549.70 
Overburden 60840.00 
Fuel/Freight 6319.65 
Parts 3686.00 
Tonnage/Overburden/ 204180.24 
P0#060? Cha1n/Forkl1ft 
2872.50 
288.05 
280310.16 
84221.00 
1263.91 
$1203851.30 
Fuel 
Parts/POL 
Tonnage/Overburden/ 
Forklift 
January Stand-By 
Parts/POL 
f-t 31 
PAID BY BALANCE DUE REMARKS 
Fuel Credit of 
11/22/85 
Advance 11/14 
$1555.42 
Paid CM201 of 
10/31/85 
Fuel Credit of 
11/22/85 
Paid Ck#201 of 
10/31/85 
Paid CM201 of 
10/31/85 
Paid by Agree-
ment of 10/14 
Paid Ck#201 of 
10/31 ($4534) 
Paid by Agree-
ment of 10/14 
Advance 11/14 
Advance 11/14 
Paid by Agree-
ment of 10/14 
($48480.00) 
Paid by RIHT 
Paid Ck#1083 
Advance 11/14 
Paid Ck# 
Advance 11/14 
/y,J3-'*° 
$ 1338.00 
5186.35 
23335.00 
$590850.44 
6319.65 
3686.00 
204180.24 
2872.50 
288.05 
280310.16 
84221.00 
1263.91 
$613000.86 
Balance Paid with 
Fuel Credit 11/22 
Includes Tax/Sept 
October Rent 
Balance Paid with 
11/14 Advance 
Balance Paid with 
Fuel Credit 11/22 
($ 13088.65) 
December Rental 
January Rental 
Cost Basis Only 
